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Chapter 1 
Protest and Principle in State Welfare 
Introduction 
What part did social movements play in the formation of state welfare? Many 
accounts relegate social movements to a footnote in the development of state 
welfare while emphasising the role played by politicians, professional bodies 
and state administrators. Yet more was involved than the benevolent actions 
of a few elite individuals and groups. This chapter examines the prehistory of 
state welfare and explores the role attributed to social movements from 
competing social scientific perspectives. In order to do so, we compare 
perhaps the most influential account of the rise of the welfare state as 
expressing social rights, namely T.H. Marshall’s (1950) lecture and essay 
‘Social Class and Citizenship’, to ‘one of the earliest and finest Marxist 
analyses of the welfare state’ (Mishra, 1981: 75), that of John Saville’s essay 
‘The Welfare State: An Historical Approach’ (1957-8). Both accounts 
appeared at a precise historical moment, that of the post-war, high water-
mark for the egalitarian hopes that were placed in state welfare in Britain. 
Since this moment is often viewed in retrospect as a ‘golden age’ for state 
welfare, revisiting the analyses of leading British social scientists and 
historians of that age provides us with a measure of how they accounted for 
the role played by social movements from below.  
Both Marshall and Saville locate state welfare within a wider socio-historical 
trajectory in the development of British social policy. The major faultline that 
this chapter focuses on is the debate between idealist and materialist 
approaches to the history of welfare. Marshall tends to picture this as a 
smooth line in the almost inevitable development of the ideal of social rights 
while Saville tends to emphasise the social conditions that lie behind the 
discontinuous and contingent nature of social rights. This allows us to 
compare their respective accounts according to the sociological precept that 
people make history in conditions that they do not choose. Social reform 
therefore occurs in a historical conjuncture which contains the following 
elements: constraints and possibilities imposed by objective institutional 
structures; some combination of historical continuities and discontinuities 
represented by a crisis like war or social upheaval; the role played by values, 
ideas and principles; and a willingness of broad masses of people to 
undertake popular mobilisation from below. In contrast to the hegemony of the 
top-down social administration school represented by Marshall and others we 
are at pains in this book to restore the bottom-up element in the contested 
and contentious politics of state welfare. More reflection of the role played by 
social movements and direct action provides a long overdue antidote to what 
EP Thompson called ‘the condescension of posterity’ in the erasure of 
struggles from below in many accounts of the establishment of social policy.  
 
Citizenship rights: A Whig history 
Perhaps the most famous sociological account of the rise of state welfare was 
penned some sixty years ago by T.H. Marshall (1950) in his celebrated essay 
‘Citizenship and Social Class’. Marshall was Professor of Sociology at the 
London School of Economics (LSE), which was founded in 1883 by the 
Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb. A social reformist colouration 
was stamped on Sociology at the LSE with the overlap between Fabian 
socialism and the ‘New Liberalism’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Halsey, 2004). This social reformist confluence, known as ‘Lib-
Labism’ after its peculiar mixture of Liberalism and Labourism, resulted in the 
dominance at the LSE of the tradition of social scientific investigation known 
as ‘social administration’. Social administration emphasised empirical 
research as essential to underpin pragmatic, practical solutions to social 
problems from the top downwards, a tradition that is alive and well in the 
dominant approach of today’s ‘evidence-based social policy’. Social 
administration sat within a distinctively British intellectual approach to 
distinctively British social problems and the assumed civilising mission of 
Britain at home and abroad. Its intellectual underpinning, British Idealism, 
appealed to the rational mind, or social conscience, that the empirical 
evidence for reform was compelling and that the reforms themselves required 
careful management by qualified experts in social administration, objective 
bureaucracy and welfare professionalism. 
 
New Liberalism advocated an interventionist role for the state to ensure that 
all citizens in the national community are able to exercise the positive freedom 
to participate fully in its political and cultural life. In 1907 a leading New 
Liberal, L.T. Hobhouse, was appointed by the LSE to the UK’s first 
professorship in the relatively new discipline of sociology (Halsey, 2004). In 
his major work The Elements of Social Justice (1922) Hobhouse rooted the 
case for citizenship-based welfare reform within a tradition of Idealist social 
philosophy. Idealism in this context assumes that social reform can be 
achieved by appeals to rational dialogue and moral sentiment, leading to a 
change in the minds of doubters and sceptics. British Idealism influenced the 
development of sociology in Britain through Hobhouse’s evolutionary 
approach to a ‘social mentality’ which holds communities together through 
shared social norms. Communities evolve most efficiently where individuals 
have the capacity and opportunity to develop as freely interacting, equal 
personalities, adapting social norms in the process. Therefore state 
intervention is permitted to create equal opportunities for personal growth and 
remove unnecessary constraints on inter-personal development like poverty, 
ignorance, sickness and destitution. As Marshall (1950: 16) expressed it: 
 
The duty to improve and civilize oneself is therefore a social duty, and 
not merely a personal one, because the social health of a society 
depends upon the civilization of its members. And a community that 
enforces this duty has begun to realize that its culture is an organic unity 
and its civilization a national heritage. 
 
Class antagonisms were to be mitigated by a nationalist pride in Imperial 
British values, a racially-based sense of superiority, and the subordination of 
women through an ideology of motherhood to the role of efficient procreation 
for the nation (Williams, 1989). This tradition culminated in the Beveridge 
Report of 1942, whose attack on the ‘five evils’ of Disease, Want, Squalor, 
Ignorance and Idleness aimed to raise the status of (male) British citizens 
through addressing material deficiencies in ways that were thought 
compatible with a market economy, the British empire and the patriarchal 
family structure.  
 
Within this tradition Marshall set out his classical approach to citizenship in 
the immediate post-war period (1949) just when it appeared that the 
inequalities of social class might be ameliorated – though certainly not 
abolished – by the equal rights conferred by full citizenship of a national 
community. Indeed Marshall (1950: 7) argued that equal rights helped to 
legitimate class inequalities, ‘so much so that citizenship has itself become, in 
certain respects, the architect of legitimate social inequality’. Overall, 
however, market-based inequalities were thought by Marshall to be lessening 
under the impact of state-led equalities of citizenship. ‘The urge forward along 
the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an 
enrichment of the stuff of which status is made and an increase in the number 
of those on whom status is bestowed’ (Marshall, 1950: 18). Social democratic 
principles of equality through the rights conferred by citizenship at last 
seemed in the ‘golden age’ of state welfare to be emerging triumphant over 
the previously dominant liberal principles of unequal competition between 
individual agents in the free market.  
 
In its insistence on gradual, peaceful reform, social democracy was credited 
by Marshall, among others, as creating the welfare state from above as the 
culminating point of the long march of civilised progress of the British nation 
by far-sighted individuals committed to high-minded ideals like equality, social 
justice and national unity. Marshall’s form of social democracy told its own 
story of the triumph of social evolution as represented by the welfare state: 
‘the modern drive towards social equality is, I believe the latest phase of an 
evolution of citizenship which has been in continuous progress for some 250 
years’ (Marshall, 1950: 7). Until then feudal society made any claim to social 
justice a rather arbitrary affair based on the status enjoyed (or not) by social 
position rather than citizenship rights in the modern sense. Social relations 
under feudalism ensured that there was no such thing as separate rights 
available equally to every member of society. It is only fairly recently that any 
such thing could be conceived and, indeed, for Marshall (1950: X) it was ‘only 
in the present  [twentieth] century, in fact I might say only within the last few 
months’ that modern citizenship rights were finally granted. This evolutionary 
story situates Marshall, like social democracy more generally, in the Whig 
tradition of historical understanding. Whig history constructs a linear narrative 
to arrange the past according to the expediency of pressing ideological needs 
in the present (Butterfield, 1932).2 
 
Social democratic Whiggery is forcefully advanced by Marshall as he unfurls a 
story of the steady progress of equality over the years until he reaches the 
summit of evolution in the months immediately before he gave his lecture. 
Class is made by Marshall to conform to an evolutionary ideal where the worst 
inequalities are erased through the rights and duties of comprehensive 
citizenship whose entitlements emerge from simply belonging to an 
increasingly just and orderly national community. This is perhaps 
understandable from Marshall’s Idealist perspective of creating an orderly and 
more equal society. In 1949 he stood at the opening-up of what many 
consider the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state and corporatist state 
management of the capitalist economy (Harris, 1972). From these heights 
rational social and political change could seem very much like a top-down 
affair, something that has an impact on lower classes and other social groups 
but that they themselves play little part in making.  
 
Famously, full citizenship depended for Marshall on the progressive capture of 
three kinds of rights: civil rights, political rights and social rights. Each of these 
elements of citizenship corresponded to certain institutions at definite stages 
in historical evolution. According to Marshall by the early nineteenth century 
 
2  The Whigs were an elite political party between the early eighteenth century and mid-
nineteenth century who defended parliamentary rule against absolutist heredity monarchical 
rule. A mythical Whig narrative developed around the theme of natural British progress 
towards liberal democracy against inherited privileges of political power. The origin of the term 
‘Whig’ is somewhat obscure. It seems to derive from the seventeenth century social 
movement of Scottish radical Presbyterians belonging to ‘the Kirk Party’ who marched in their 
thousands with widespread popular support on Edinburgh in 1648 to resist Charles 1. This 
became known derisively as the ‘Whiggamore Raid’ after the lowly status of the ‘whiggamor’ 
marchers, the Gaelic term for drivers of horse or cattle.  
civil rights were established bearing ‘in most essentials, the appearance that 
they have today’ (Marshall, 1950:10). Civil rights are those necessary for 
individual liberty, freedom of speech, the right to justice and, especially 
important for the emerging society premised on a legally-enforceable 
exchange between capital and waged labour in ‘the right to own property and 
to conclude valid contracts’ (Marshall, 1950: 8). Civil rights were won above 
all by the courts of justice, whose steady work was only disturbed by popular 
movements animated by the French revolution: ‘This eighteenth-century 
achievement, interrupted by the French revolution and completed after it, was 
in large measure the work of the courts, both in their daily practice and also in 
a series of famous cases in some of which they were fighting against 
parliament in defence of individual liberty’ (Marshall, 1950: 10). Above all, the 
individual right was won for adult males to freely chose an employer rather 
than being tied for life as an indentured serf or servile peasant.  
 
Indeed, while Marshall (1950: 11) grants the courts the main role in 
establishing civil rights he also concedes that the courts were merely ratifying 
the new reality of free wage labour: ‘The Common Law is largely a matter of 
common sense’. In other words, ‘the generally accepted way of life’ 
mentioned by Marshall was already in the throes of change well before the 
courts and Common Law formalised the new civil right to become free wage 
labourers. Moreover, by emphasising the role played by law-makers Marshall 
seriously understates the symbolic use of the language of civil rights in the 
plebeian culture of ‘free-born Englishmen’ to legitimately raise a protest 
against meagre Poor Law administration in times of want and to force 
concessions from the gentry (see chapter 2). As E.P. Thompson (1991: 74) 
summarised the reciprocal nature of eighteenth century rights: ‘The plebs 
were aware that a ruling-class that rested its claim to legitimacy upon 
prescription and law had little authority to over-rule their own customs and 
rights’.  
 
Political rights took longer to be granted and initially depended on the 
successful exercise of civil rights to acquire property. Nineteenth century 
reforms, principally the 1832 Reform Act, extended the franchise to very 
limited sections of society, that of freehold property owners. Not until the 1918 
Representation of the People Act was the franchise widened on the 
democratic basis of equal political rights – albeit limited to ‘manhood’ suffrage 
only – rather than on the exclusive basis of property ownership. Nevertheless 
full political rights even when formally granted, as in the right to vote or stand 
for election, remained restricted where class prejudice was perpetuated by a 
deferential attitude among the working class to ‘the elites who were born, bred 
and educated for leadership’ (Marshall, 1950: 22). Gradually, in Marshall’s 
narrative, the working class established a political identity independent of elite 
groups. As they did so, political rights became entwined with the demand for 
social rights. Universal suffrage was therefore sought by the working class 
less as an end in itself, as some immanent Idealist unfolding of the democratic 
principle of equality, than as a means to redress immediate social grievances. 
 
As new civil rights progressed alongside the free market in wage labour a 
conflict ensued with traditional social rights to protection through local wage 
regulation and Poor Law support. This reflected the shift from a society 
arranged by status to one organised by contract. Status conferred by 
membership of a local community came into conflict with the contract struck 
between independent individuals in the marketplace. Attempts to regulate the 
market through the Speenhamland system of a guaranteed wage and family 
support were doomed to failure under the new spirit of capitalist individualism 
(Polanyi, 1944). By the time of the 1834 Poor Law Act traditional social rights 
were forced to retreat more completely under the claims made by free market 
competition. Forced into the workhouse, and thus into a dependent, non-
market relationship, the poor and the destitute were denied any scrap of civil 
or political rights.  
 
By 1950, for Marshall, social rights were enshrined in the equal status 
afforded by institutions of the welfare state, overturning the domination of life 
by the laissez-faire contractual bargaining between individuals. ‘Social rights 
in their modern form imply an invasion of contract by status, the subordination 
of market price to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the 
declaration of rights’ (Marshall, 1950: 40). However, Marshall provides little 
sense of the social forces that brought the universal franchise or social rights 
into existence. He emphasises a clash of incompatible principles rather than a 
clash of social class interests when he claims that: ‘the impact of citizenship 
on social class takes the form of a conflict between opposing principles’ 
(Marshall, 1950: 18). By focusing on principles and ideals Marshall’s Whig 
history tends to impose an idealist teleology on the history of welfare and 
downplay material constraints and opportunities. Political reforms therefore 
appear as the Idealist demi-urge of an evolutionary principle of equality rather 
than an unceasing, now open/now hidden struggle between antagonistic 
social groups. Hence, for Marshall the principles of equality embodied in 
citizenship rights are ‘at war’ with the principles of inequality embodied in the 
capitalist class system. Such principles animated the emerging package of 
social rights – ‘from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security 
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall, 
1950: 8). Status therefore depends upon principles while contract depends 
upon interests. Attempts to establish an ‘equality of status’ rather than an 
equalisation of incomes indicates that conflicts over the wage contract are 
essentially something secondary, as Marshall notes in his discussion of trade 
unionism.  
 
It is only outside of formal political citizenship that Marshall recognises an 
alternative source of social power. In the trade unions’ creation of a parallel 
system of ‘industrial citizenship’ the working class used their combined civil 
rights as free wage labour to demand social rights. ‘These civil rights became, 
for the workers, an instrument for raising their social and economic status, 
that is to say, for establishing the claim that they, as citizens, were entitled to 
certain social rights’ (Marshall, 1950: 26). This demand by trade unions for 
social rights was heard, Marshall notes, during the industrial militancy of the 
Great Unrest (1910-1914) that swept Britain in the years before the First 
World War. By 1950 trade unions could defend social rights by working 
collaboratively within government, whereas ‘in the past trade unionism had to 
assert social rights by attacks delivered from outside the system in which 
power resided’ (Marshall, 1950: 41). For Marshall this means that trade union 
leaders must respect ‘the duties of citizenship’, above all political stability and 
social order, and take ‘responsibility’ for the wider welfare of the national 
community. Unofficial action by the trade union rank and file represents a 
repudiation of responsibility, acting in their own narrow self-interest as a 
throwback to an earlier phase in the evolution of social rights. Since this is 
one of the few times that Marshall (1950: 41) considers in any detail the role 
played by subjective agency from below it is worth quoting his thought in full: 
 
Trade union leaders in general accept this [responsibility], but this is not 
true of all members of the rank and file. The traditions built up at a time 
when trade unions were fighting for their existence, and when conditions 
of employment depended wholly on the outcome of unequal bargaining, 
make its acceptance very difficult. Unofficial strikes have become very 
frequent, and it is clear that one important element in industrial disputes 
is discord between trade union leaders and certain sections of trade 
union members. Now duties can derive either from status or from 
contract. Leaders of unofficial strikes are liable to reject both. The strikes 
usually involve breach of contract or the repudiation of agreements. 
Appeal is made to some allegedly higher principle – in reality, though this 
may not be expressly asserted, to the status rights of industrial 
citizenship … In some recent unofficial strikes an attempt has, I think, 
been made to claim the rights both of status and of contract while 
repudiating the duties under both these heads.  
 
Rank and file union members show scant regard for the formal duties of 
citizenship and insist on the informal democracy of unofficial action in defence 
of their contractual rights. Such action placed strikes and other forms of what 
became known as ‘extra-parliamentary action’ outside the terms of national 
citizenship. Workers taking industrial action in their own interest were 
consigned to the status of irrational Others, acting on the fringes of reason 
and responsibility.  
 
Marshall’s formal sociology of citizenship tidies away the haphazardly strewn 
historical material of class struggle and social movements. Absent is any 
consideration of the role of the urban bourgeoisie in mobilising the apparently 
natural claim of civil rights in its conflict with the feudal rights of the ancien 
regime. Neither is there much recognition of the role played in the struggle for 
political rights by the emergent working class movements like the Chartists 
(Thompson, 1984). Finally, while there is some mention of trade unionism in 
the struggle for social rights, the wider context of the labour movement and 
the proximity of a revolutionary threat, and the dangers of wartime 
mobilisation in the development of state welfare is overlooked. Outside of 
antagonistic social interests, Marshall’s ‘principles’ of equality arise deus ex 
machina from a ‘social conscience’ that wishes to alleviate the worst aspects 
of class suffering, ‘class-abatement’ insofar as it maintains existing class 
relations. From the Idealist heights of social administration, Marshall 
naturalises class inequalities by comparing it to environmental ‘nuisances’ like 
the acrid smoke belching from factory chimneys: ‘And so in time, as the social 
conscience stirs to life, class-abatement, like smoke-abatement, becomes a 
desirable aim to be pursued as far as is compatible with the continued 
efficiency of the social machine’ (Marshall, 1950: 20). As Tom Bottomore 
(1992: 73) summed up the limits to Marshall’s teleological history of 
citizenship rights: 
 
Specific social groups were involved in the struggle to extend or restrict 
such rights, and in these conflicts social classes have played a major 
part. Marshall recognised that a measure of conflict existed but he 
expressed it as a clash between opposing principles rather than between 
classes, and his discussion of class was primarily concerned, as he said, 
with the impact of citizenship on social class, not with the ways in which 
the historical development of classes had itself generated new 
conceptions of citizenship and movements to expand the rights of 
citizens. 
 
Marshall was always at pains to champion social justice and equal opportunity 
within a social democratic framework. Later when a new wave of social 
movements made themselves felt in the 1960s and 1970s, Marshall (1972) 
turned his attention to what he called the ‘value-problems of welfare-
capitalism’. Unless the value demands of the protest movements are 
accommodated within the social framework of representative government, the 
mixed economy and the welfare state, Marshall (1972: 32) argued, the 
alternative would be some variant of totalitarian rule: ‘The transformation 
sought by the more purposeful and less destructive sections of those voicing 
our present discontents is one of attitudes and values rather than of basic 
structure, though institutional change changes are sought as a means to this 
end, as is also the protection of the environment’. Marshall could not foresee 
at this stage that the alternative was not one between the value-rationality of 
deepening social democracy or the bureaucratic rationality of Stalinism.  
 
It may be that Marshall was simply proposing an ideal-type evolutionary 
schema as a heuristic device for understanding his trinity of rights. While his 
essay depends on this kind of purchase from Idealist reductionism, he is also 
concerned throughout to appeal to the empirical basis for the emergence of 
social rights. His essay can be seen as both a guide to thinking about rights 
and an historical interpretation of the specific case of England (rather than 
Britain). Be that as it may, an Idealist commitment to evolutionary Whiggery 
prevented Marshall from registering that the onset of crisis and the emerging 
ideology of the New Right would herald a neoliberal attack on the values of 
welfare capitalism for an entire generation. It is the concern of the rest of this 
chapter to outline the contested, non-teleological development of welfare 
rights, understood not merely as the clash of competing principles but also as 
the clash of antagonistic social forces. This will, arguably, demarcate the 
ground upon which both the rise of new social movements and the neoliberal 
counter-assault were prepared. 
 
The New Left, reform and protest 
An alternative socio-historical framework for understanding the rise of state 
welfare emerged within ten years of Marshall’s account. In the second half of 
the 1950s a generation of politically engaged historians and intellectuals of 
the British New Left challenged some of the political assumptions of the times 
(Chun, 1995; Kenny, 1995). Disillusioned with Stalinist dogma and the 
orthodoxy of the Communist Party of Great Britain, and revolted by its 
uncritical support for the Soviet repression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, 
a number of talented socialist intellectuals attempted to create a new, 
independent social and political movement through the critical rejuvenation of 
Marxist ideas. Out of this milieu, a socio-historical approach to the welfare 
state was given a particularly sharp expression by the Marxist historian John 
Saville (1957-8). Almost as a detailed rejoinder to Marshall, in his 1957 essay 
for the New Left journal New Reasoner, Saville challenges the idea that the 
welfare state represents a staging post in the inevitable path to socialism and 
equality. Instead, Saville (1957-8: 5-6) argues, the welfare state emerged 
thanks to the interaction of three underlying dimensions:  
 
(1) the struggle of the working class against their exploitation; (2) the 
requirements of industrial capitalism (a convenient abstraction) for a more 
efficient environment in which to operate and in particular the need for 
highly productive labour force; (3) recognition by the property owners of 
the price that has to be paid for political security. 
 
It is not only class struggle that determined the shape of state welfare. Social 
policy also became a functional precondition for the further accumulation of 
capital and the political concessions granted under the framework of liberal-
democratic institutions provided the best shell for channeling social 
antagonism away from more incendiary forms of protest and struggle.  
 
In his claim that ‘it is not the middle class or any group of property owners 
who have been the prime mover in social change’, Saville (1957-8: 9) does 
not attempt to minimise the role played by the challenge from below of the 
labour movement. His point is that the more thoughtful and enlightened 
sections of the ruling class began to converge with the demands of working 
class socialism for the need for a more thorough programme of radical reform. 
In this way fundamental disputes between the classes about property rights 
might be avoided or mitigated in the interests of economic efficiency and 
political stability. This has some echoes with Marshall’s claims about class-
abatement and abatement of conflict, as well as a longer tradition of radical 
New Liberal thought and middle class reformism like the Fabianism of the 
Webbs. However, Saville (1957-8: 9) departs radically from Marshall’s claim 
that ‘social conscience’ animated by higher values and collective principles of 
citizenship was the bedrock cause of social reform: ‘Social conscience, except 
in the hearts and minds of a small minority among the middle class is a frail 
instrument of social policy, and conscience normally requires the support of 
some powerful “interest” before it is translated into practice’. As a Marxist, 
Saville (1957-8: 10) instead holds that social reform is the product of class 
struggle, where the shape, organisation and determination of working class 
pressure from below determines the evolution of state welfare, and that the 
ruling class only concedes reforms reluctantly and grudgingly: ‘Only the 
massive development of the working class movement and the recourse to 
methods of direct action have been able to shift the mountains of unreason 
that have built themselves upon the foundations of private property’. 
 
After the shock to bourgeois values represented by Chartism and the state 
repression that followed the 1848 mass mobilisation the working class 
became ever more firmly locked outside the formal politics of parliamentary 
democracy (Saville, 1990). In this void workers developed their own defensive 
organisations in the form of trade unions created by and for skilled craftsman. 
At the height of its mobilisations in 1839, 1842 and 1848 Chartism threatened 
to overturn existing property relations so dangerous was the demand for basic 
democratic rights in those years (Charlton, 1997). The ‘six points’ of the 
Charter – universal suffrage, equal representation, removal of property 
qualifications, annual parliaments, payment for MPs, and use of the ballot – 
provided a focus for the formation of a truly national working class movement 
across the length and breadth of Britain (Thompson, 1984). This was far from 
the evolutionary course of events plotted by British Whig History where 
reason would sooner or (more usually) later prevail over the militant hotheads 
making utopian demands for democracy and social justice in the here and 
now. Both the 1832 Reform Act and the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act 
decisively excluded the working class from participation in the official political 
of British democracy, setting the context for the mass movement that grew up 
in support of the Charter mobilisations in the late 1830s and 1840s. As 
Charlton (1997: 84) puts it, ‘If there was any hint that the Charter might have 
been a means for the middle class to siphon off working class fury over the 
New Poor Law it was blown apart by the belligerent mass meetings in the 
North in 1839, the South Wales Rising and the partial uncovering of 
insurrectionary plotting in several parts of the country’. 
 
The franchise was only gradually extended to the working class in the period 
from 1867 until 1918, and 1927 for working class women. But where Marshall 
might see this as part of the natural evolutionary course in the typically British 
tradition of slow but sure political reform, Saville views it as a stalling game by 
the ruling class to deflect the potential political power represented by the 
numerical superiority of proletarian voters. Delay in the introduction of basic 
political rights for the working class by a few decades allowed the Tories and 
the Liberals to occupy more favourable ground than their previous defence of 
an exclusive right to property might suggest. Saville (in 1957-8: 14) quotes the 
Radical Liberal Joseph Chamberlain from an 1885 speech advocating an 
early blue-print of the welfare state: ‘what ransom will property pay for the 
security which it enjoys?’ In the conflict between the civil rights of contract and 
the social rights of status far-sighted Liberals made judgements about how to 
cope with the democratic ‘ransom’ that the working class would inevitably 
demand. Which outcome overall would best maintain political stability and 
existing property relations became a pressing matter of elite reflection. A 
judicious approach to reform from above represents the obverse side of elite 
fears of radical working class mobilisation from below. Saville notes that this 
tactic also had the effect of delaying the emergence of a mass-membership 
socialist party in Britain and, it might be added, clouded the reception of 
Marxism within the British labour movement (Hobsbawm, 2007). 
 
When the Labour Party finally emerged it immediately came under the 
influence of liberal reformism, ‘Lib-Labism’, and initially refused to let itself be 
known as a ‘socialist party’ (Miliband, 1972). Here the influence of the Fabian 
Society proved decisive in defining the ideological terrain of state welfare, 
building on the ideals represented by the New Liberalism. Fabianism stressed 
the practical and pragmatic nature of reform where the nineteenth century 
state was already compelled by efficiency claims, as much as by the claims of 
social justice, to intervene in market relations to alleviate widespread 
hardship. For leading Fabians like Sidney and Beatrice Webb ‘practical men’ 
oblivious of or hostile to any collectivist ideology had by the turn of the 
twentieth century already come to depend on the ‘unconscious socialism’ of 
municipal planning and Public Health legislation (Briggs, 1962). Crucial here 
was the idea that once ‘the facts’ of social degradation were exposed before a 
well-meaning middle class public their social conscience would be stirred into 
action and such rational minds would be compelled to accept the tide of 
collective provision rather than fight against it. More radical working class 
demands for the full franchise and a more comprehensive transformation of 
the social structure could thereby be stilled by judicious elite action. As Sidney 
Webb complained in 1896, ‘The difficulty in England is not to secure more 
political power for the people, but to persuade them to make any sensible use 
of the power they already have’ (in Bruce, 1968: 161).  
 
Having established the constellation of conditions - class struggle, economic 
efficiency and political stability - that precipitated greater state intervention for 
the collective provision of welfare, Saville (1957-8: 16-17) identifies the three 
phases of reform in the first half of the twentieth century. First, the wave of 
Liberal reforms of 1906 to 1914 included: 
 
1906 meals for deprived school children  
1907 medial inspection for school children 
1908 first old age pensions 
1909 introduction of minimum wage for selected industries 
1911 beginning of national health and unemployment insurance 
 
Second, Saville gives the example of how the ruling class rode out the high 
point of working class militancy in 1919 through delay, evasion, and 
concession, while Lloyd George cleverly outflanked the tamely inept 
leadership of the Labour Party and the trade unions. Hence the reforms of the 
interwar Conservative and Labour Governments were piecemeal reflections of 
an emerging ‘middle way’: 
 
1918 Maternity and Child Welfare Act 
1919 Housing and Town Planning Act 
1920 Unemployment Insurance Act 
1926 Haddow Report on education  
1927 Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act 
1934 Unemployment Act 
 
Finally, the 1945-1950 Labour Government introduced what became the 
modern welfare state. Standing so close in time to Labour’s welfare reforms 
Saville (1957-8: 17) is careful to indicate that the welfare state was not as 
radical as has since been portrayed in many ‘golden age’ accounts but 
represented a minimum programme of reform acceptable to the Conservative 
opposition: ‘It was a modest programme, and a couple of decades overdue by 
the standards of the previous half century and its achievement was followed 
by a partial retreat in 1950 with the imposition of charges for certain health 
services’. In some respects the welfare state must be considered a success 
for those that opposed any ‘socialist measures’ that threatened to interfere 
with the workings of the free market, including the market in wage labour. 
‘Since the welfare state in Britain developed within a mature capitalist society, 
with a ruling class long experienced and much skilled in the handling of public 
affairs, its growth and development has been slow and controlled; and the 
central interests of property have never seriously been challenged’ (Saville, 
1957-8: 24).  
 
The radicalisation of British society provoked by wartime measures led to a 
mainstream consensus across the Labour and Conservative parties that 
managed reform was preferable to unchecked grievances from below (Calder, 
1969). As the Conservative Quentin Hogg (later Lord Hailsham) put it in a 
debate in the House of Commons in 1943: ‘If you do not give the people 
social reforms they are going to give you social revolution’ (Hansard, 17 
February 1943). After decades of winning at best piecemeal reforms the 
labour movement came to regard the welfare state as its lasting achievement, 
a valedictory lesson for the futility of more radical protest movements led by 
the Communist Party and the Independent Labour Party which in the past had 
made unrealistic demands for the socialist transformation of society. ‘The 
struggle for any particular reform has always in this country aroused so much 
opposition that when it is achieved it is at least understandable that those who 
have spent half a lifetime on its behalf too easily believe that with its 
enactment a new period of social history is beginning’ (Saville, 1957-8: 17).  
 
This was true for at least the more reformist sections of the New Left who 
argued that state welfare combined with the Labour government’s programme 
of nationalisation represented a ‘transition to socialism’. In the debate in the 
pages of The New Reasoner that followed Saville’s essay, Dorothy Thompson 
(1958) contended that the British welfare state was ‘profoundly anti-capitalist’ 
because services are provided on the basis of need rather than ability to pay. 
By reducing social reforms as mere ‘palliatives’ that the ruling class were 
prepared to concede anyway, Saville had minimised the role played by the 
‘mass pressure’ of the working class:  
 
It had to be fought for at every stage, and although the leaders of 
individual campaigns – such as those for family allowances or free 
school meals, may have appeared to be isolated humanitarians, their 
support has always come from the organised labour movement – as well, 
of course, as from humanitarians in all parts of society. What is more, the 
opposition has always come from the spokesmen of property, and it 
significant that the first move made by Conservative chancellors when a 
reduction in government expenditure is called for has been towards 
these same services. This is not only because the government itself 
hates them, but because the whole political philosophy of those who 
support such governments is against the conception of need as a 
criterion of service. (Thompson, 1958: 127-8). 
 
For Thompson, working class organisation and values, the objective function 
of public sector welfare workers, the growing scale of the capitalist enterprise, 
and the internal divisions of the ruling class all indicate that capitalism is 
incubating the future socialist society in the womb of the existing society. 
State welfare represented a material victory for working class movements and 
values, what Marx called ‘the political economy of the working class’, of ‘social 
responsibility and human dignity’ prevailing over exchange and profit. In their 
commitment to public service rather than private profit teachers, doctors, and 
health workers constitute ‘an objectively anti-capitalist force in society’ 
(Thompson, 1958: 129). Social reform is less a demonstration of the 
impregnable unity of the ruling class in their ability to delay, fudge and deflect 
state welfare, so emphasised by Saville, than an indication of the deep 
divisions within their ranks, which, in their mutual antipathy and competition 
with each other, sometimes breaks out into open civil war. State welfare is 
only possible where an ideological or political crisis exposes such divisions as 
they emerge from the internal competition among capitalists, with the larger, 
more efficient producer consuming the weaker, less efficient one, ultimately 
precipitating a crisis of the entire system of private property. ‘The combined 
demands for social services and higher wages put forward by the working 
class will continue to drive out the less efficient capitalist, and to tax the 
national productive capacity, perhaps to breaking point’ (Thompson, 1958: 
129). Attempts would indeed be made to resolve imbalances between tax 
revenues and social welfare benefits but in ways that would reverse any 
supposed line of evolution towards socialism. 
 
This optimistic, evolutionary prognosis was widely-held by the labour 
movement and social democratic intellectuals at the time. It was also widely 
felt that there would be continuous forward movement towards equality, 
something that was rudely discounted by Saville’s prescient internationalist 
insight that the decline of British imperialism would place added strains on the 
British economy to continue to deliver welfare improvements: ‘When therefore 
we accept, and rightly, the achievement of the Welfare state as the product of 
working class agitation and struggle, we should also be clear that a part, at 
least, of the flexibility and maneuverability of the ruling class has been derived 
from the possession of the world’s largest Empire’ (1957-8: 24). Only later 
would it become clear that this view of state welfare as a supposedly 
privileged site for the ‘organic national unity’ of white male Britons was also 
rapidly becoming untenable with immigration from Asia and the West Indies, 
not least to occupy the lowest rungs of the welfare state hierarchy (Williams, 
1989). Saville is also concerned that the very success represented by the 
welfare state and large-scale political trade union organisation had become 
‘social and political shock absorbers’, demobilising struggles from below by 
confusing a more comprehensive socialist programme with improved living 
standards and levels of security that were contingent on the post-war 
economic boom. In such ways the labour movement became tied up in 
ideological knots: ‘on the one hand since they are the result of struggle, the 
labour movement has grown stronger with success; on the other, since so far 
social and economic reforms have easily been absorbed into the economic 
system, there is an immense confusion of ideas as to what exactly has been 
achieved’ (Saville, 1957-8: 24).  
 
As the mythical national consensus around ‘fair shares for all’ and British ‘fair 
play’ began to breakdown in the 1960s the kind of critique raised by Saville 
against Marshallian approaches to British citizenship became more widely 
shared by an emerging generation of activists and intellectuals. Hence, by the 
mid-1960s Dorothy Wedderburn (1965: 143) could echo Saville’s emphasis 
on the need ‘to focus attention on the demands of the working class for social 
justice and upon an analysis of the political strength of the working class; and 
its success in winning allies from particular pressure and interest groups’. By 
then new social movements, student radicalism, anti-racist struggles, second-
wave feminism and working class struggles were beginning to emerge to 
redefine the terrain upon which state welfare would be contested over the 
next decade and beyond. And, waiting in the wings, a counter-assault would 
emerge to selectively assimilate previously marginal agendas of the new 
social movements while attempting to roll back the seemingly unassailable 
gains of state welfare and the forces that made them. 
 
Conclusion 
People do not make history in conditions that they themselves have freely 
chosen. This sociological axiom illuminates our understanding of the 
formation, development and reproduction of the institutions of the welfare 
state. According to this axiom a number of inter-related elements have been 
forefronted in this chapter that are often neglected or downplayed in the study 
of social policy. Conflicting understandings of the historical making of the 
welfare state emerged from the post-war debate represented by Marshall and 
Saville. It is clear that the relationship between social movements and social 
policy is always a multi-faceted one. We want to highlight five core elements 
from this chapter:  
 
1. the subjective role of collective agency;  
2. the limits and possibilities of objective institutional structures;  
3. historical continuities and discontinuities;  
4. the role played by values, ideas and principles; and  
5. popular mobilisation from below.  
 
First of all, the Marshall-Saville debate in this chapter helped re-establish the 
importance of subjective agency in historically shaping the contours of state 
welfare. For Marshall agency is bound up with those elite institutions that 
support civil, political and social rights; for Saville agency concerns the 
contending sides in the struggle between the classes.  
 
Second, the historical preconditions are both constraining – people encounter 
objectively-given conditions that places limits on what they can realistically do 
– and permissible – these conditions permit and support, as well as prohibit 
social actions of various kinds. Through the collective agency of social 
movements objectively-given conditions are themselves altered in the 
process. A centrally important discovery of the chapter is that institutional 
structures not only inhibit social action they also make social action possible 
in the first place. While Saville is alive to the power of ruling groups to 
frustrate, reduce and delay reform as an objective constraint on working class 
demands, Marshall presents us with a vision of British historical evolution as 
an expression of the civilized values that unifies the national community. The 
result is an abstract form of agency without a subject.  
 
Third, history is punctuated by discontinuous moments of change. The history 
of the welfare state is not simply an evolutionary, ‘upwards and onwards’ 
steady march of progress as Marshall would have it. State welfare has equally 
been shaped by dramatic moments of conflict and contention, as well as more 
mundane forms of resistance and passive acquiescence. As Saville 
explained, the history of social policy has therefore been marked by sharp 
discontinuities in the ideological legitimation and institutional politics of 
welfare. On the other hand, systemic continuities are represented by the 
survival of private property, although this can sometimes be muffled by the 
ideological contention over the meaning and significance of state reforms and 
public provision. 
 
Fourth, agency is not an exclusively top-down prerogative. In many influential 
accounts state welfare appears as if it was the creation of far-sighted and 
benevolent elite institutions and individuals sharing in a national value 
consensus. As we have seen, for Marshall and Fabian reformism a social 
conscience is stimulated by rational arguments conducted at the apex of 
representative interest groups and qualified experts. Persuasive appeals are 
made to ethical values, the empirical evidence and a pragmatic approach to 
social reform. Both Marshall and Saville share a concern to establish the 
important role played by far-sighted elite groups introducing reform from 
above, managing and controlling its extent and nature. On the other hand, 
Saville’s historical materialism registers the different facets of welfare reform 
in the structures of divergent class interests within capitalism, whereas 
Marshall invokes the growing convergence of principles in a value consensus 
spread across class society.  
 
Finally, as Saville demonstrates, the structure of society at any point in time 
sets definite limits and constraints on the kind of social action that is possible. 
But, conversely, social action through popular mobilisation has an effect, 
directly or indirectly, on the very nature of the social structure. In other words, 
agency from below cannot be consigned to a political or social vacuum by the 
wiliness of ruling class stratagems. The following chapter selectively 
examines concrete historical examples of protest and principle in the making 
and deflection of social reform. It also centrally explores the contribution that 
social movements make to our understanding of state welfare. 
